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2. Ethics of Illegality 
1. Chains, 
Adhocracy, 
Categorical Value 
Cannabis sativa is the most widely produced and consumed illicit substance in the world (UNODC 
2013), with the bulk of cultivation in the Global South. There is a growing sense among policy 
makers that the “war on drugs” has failed, with decriminalisation and state regulation of cannabis 
seen as increasingly favourable. Particular attention has focussed on West Africa figuring as a 
production and distribution hub for a range of narcotic drugs; the activities of which have been 
associated with increasing levels of gang violence; trafficking and terrorism. Narcotic drugs 
undermine the rule of law but are an important source of livelihood for the urban and rural poor. 
Presently there is limited research on how production and distribution of illicit substances in the 
Global South are organised outside the regulatory framework of the state. This makes it difficult to 
think about what successful decriminalisation strategies might look like, and what the socio-
economic and political effects of narcotics in West Africa might be.  
 
 
 
 
  
 1. What is the organisational form of cannabis sativa production 
and distribution? 
 
2. What are the regulatory mechanisms for ensuring co-ordination 
and co-operation in the drug market? 
  
  
•  11 ½ months participant observation 
• 56 interviews with cultivators and distributors 
• Archival research 
 
Creolisation considers the processes by which particular cultural patterns and social 
relations emerge amongst societies that were historically de-socialised and displaced (e.g. 
returnee slaves). Large number of different ethnicities mixed during the slave to constitute 
the Sierra Leonean state we see today. Two implications emerge from analysis of these 
processes of change: 
 
 
1. Social relations not primarily organised around 
essential identities (e.g. ethnicity, religion), but 
rather, identity is instrumental.  
  
Hypothesis: Drug economy not organised 
around ethnically bonded groups. 
 
2. Economic behaviour and practice is 
shaped by these histories of social and 
cultural change. 
  
Hypothesis: Co-ordination and co-
operation in drug economy does not 
conform to conventional models in 
economic sociology.  
 Viewed as on the fringes of the state, illegal markets are generally understood 
to require a strong central authority, with violence as a sanctioning capacity 
to ensure co-ordination and co-operation, and enforce the ‘rules of the game’. 
The organisational form is hierarchical along clan/family lines, with a strong 
central authority to compensate for high buy-in costs. Think of The Sopranos.  
 
Alternatively, in the Global South, the organisational form is viewed as flat, 
organised along bonds of ethnicity, with relatively low buy-in costs that 
counteract the need for centralised authority. Think of Somali piracy.  
 
Likewise, important co-ordination problems in illegal markets, like the value of 
the commodity (how much we think something is worth)—be it organs, child 
pornography or narcotic drugs—is believed to be beyond doubt.  
These assumptions underpin typical models of organised crime.  
The cannabis sativa market inverts these assumptions. It appears 
to lack organisational form, yet corresponds to categorical 
distinctions in value determination. It is not hierarchical, but 
relatively flat. There is a system of ‘bosses’ in cultivation who de 
facto ‘own’ and rent out land, yet a young male floating population 
is drawn upon for labour. Land owners cut across a range of ages 
and ethnicities. Pushers, those that distribute cannabis, have a 
variety of different backgrounds. Some are established, some less 
so. The threat of violence is rare, yet participants hold and practice 
strong notions of private property rights. Three features are 
outlined below: 
 
  
A. The organisation of cannabis production and distribution is 
referred to by my informants as chain work: 
 
• “Me now, I am the grower, then we have the pedlars and we 
have the main sellers and buyers, that is chain work. I am the 
grower, I have a middle man, which I can link with and sell it. 
You see? This is the chain work” 
 
C. During price negotiations between pushers and buyers, the discussion is about 
price, but does not correspond to price as read off the intersection between 
supply and demand: 
 
 • Tina: “One pεku [i.e. ¼ of a kilo] is 50,000, two pεkus are 100,000, 
three pεkus are 150,000” 
• Me: “So how does the price of one pεku change?” 
• Tina: “This is a small-large pεku, maybe 75,000 le, not a large-large 
pεku” 
 
Instead negotiation of ‘price’ corresponds to categorical/ordinal schemes 
of valuation. 
 
 
 
 
Nigerian crime syndicates have a similar organisational logic, known 
as adhocracy: the ability to fuse people with different skills together, 
work on a project and then quickly disband.  
 
B.    The organisational form bare similarity to adhocracy.  
State regulation of economic activity has always remained tenuous in Sierra 
Leone. Since the chieftaincies of colonial indirect rule; involvement of Lebanese 
‘strangers’ in the diamond trade, and the patrimonial networks holding up Siaka 
Steven’s APC regime – the informal and illegal economy has been integral to the 
maintenance of state power. In this case, rather than use a functional 
interpretation of state power and ask if the state has weakened in its command 
over the bureaucratic apparatus and monopoly over means of violence, it is 
better to think in terms of regulatory authority (Roitman 2005). A discursive 
interpretation of the political is taken to emphasise the ability of a given 
authority—the state, big men, chiefs—to constitute the discursive field of “the 
economy”.  
 
 
A. Soft Touch vs. Strain 
Informants make a distinction between economic practices that, whilst 
knowingly illegal, are either licit or illicit. “Wi de sten o” (We are straining!) 
is a common phrase indexing the hard, physical labour associated with 
cannabis cultivation. Strain is contrasted with the work of those engaged in 
‘soft touch’: pickpocketing or burgling homes. Whilst the contrast between 
strain and soft touch reasons hard physical labour as licit, the distinction 
rests on respect for private property against its infringement in theft. There 
is a strong notion of private property rights among cannabis cultivators.  
 Rather than property being conceptualised as an externally imposed 
rule, it is instead something practiced.  
 
 
The analysis seeks to ascertain conditions that give rise to particular concepts and 
objects that constitute the discursive field of the economy, in which particular 
categories (e.g. informal, illegal), events (slavery, civil war), economic relationships 
(e.g. redistributive, appropriative) and production of particular kinds of spaces (e.g. 
the bush, the wharf) turn on historical and contemporary debates regarding the 
nature of wealth, property, justice and equity.  
Historically, the discursive terrain of the economy in Sierra Leone has 
been contradictory. Events such as the 1898 Hut Tax War; 1931 Tax 
Rebellion in Kambia, and notions of ‘revo-loot-ion’ among members of the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) emphasise radical changes in the nature 
of economic relationships (e.g. contribution and redistribution) and status 
of economic concepts (e.g. private property and wealth).  
This history points to multiple sources of authority in regulating the 
economy—besides the state—and for the strengthening of state power 
even whilst illegal markets continue to grow.  
 
 To analyse the regulation of illegal markets I focus on changing patterns
of reasoning in order to ascertain how informants explicate particular 
economic “truths” regarding the nature of economic objects, concepts 
and relations. I am interested in how informants comment on their 
relations to particular kinds of economic truths—on what is illegal, on 
protecting private property, on legitimate forms of wealth generation, 
on the point of paying tax—and how they live with these truths yet 
question them at the same time.  
 
• For instance, some informants bemoaned how everyone is referred to 
as a “chairman” these days: “Chair? Who? There are many chairmen 
these days!”.  Authority is less centralised and more distributed, there 
is no strict hierarchy. 
 
Informants continually contrast adhocratic forms of organisation, with 
bureaucratic ones, delimiting the boundaries of what we otherwise refer 
to as the informal economy: 
 
• “Everything is stiff […] movement is not easy […] cannot mix well” – 
such are the problems of getting a citizen’s ID card and finding a job in 
the formal economy. 
 
B.      Refraining from Violence 
Cannabis pushers put a great deal of work into refraining from the use of 
physical violence. Routinely they refer to the use of physical violence as 
being ‘advantaged’, of gaining an unfair advantage: 
 
• “write … ADVANTAGE … when you don’t offend someone but they hit 
you, they are advantaging you”. 
• “these gangs, these kliks … fight people quick … you are advantaged”. 
 
Similarly the term ‘boff’ arises in situations where one should not retaliate 
and take action, for example against a corrupt police force: 
• “You just boff, do nothing”. 
 Violence is costly. The practice of refraining from violence holds the 
cannabis market in a delicate position between being criminalised and 
yet remaining licit.  
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